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Abstract 
This study gives an overview of bank taxation as an alternative to prudential regulations or non-
revenue taxation. We review existing bank taxation with a view to eliminating distortions in the tax 
system, which have incentivized banks to engage in risky activities in the past. We furthermore 
analyze taxation of financial instruments, trading and taxation of banking products and services and 
their ability to finance resolution mechanisms for banks  to ensure their stability. In this respect, we 
put forward the following arguments: (1) that a financial transaction tax is economically inefficient 
and potentially costly for the economy and may not protect taxpayers; (2) that a bank levy used to 
finance deposit guarantee and bank resolution mechanisms is potentially useful for financial stability, 
but that it poses the threat of double taxation, together with the proposed Basel III liquidity ratios; and 
(3) that we support the elimination of exemption from value added tax (VAT) for financial services in 
order to provide banks with a level playing field, whilst retaining exemption for basic payments 
services. This is expected to improve efficiency by reducing the wasteful use of financial services.  
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Since the ‘Global, or Great, Financial Crisis’ (GFC) of 2007-9, policy makers, academics, 
and regulators have been seeking the best approach to ‘taxing’ financial institutions and their 
activities in the financial markets. There are two predominant ways of taxing banks with the 
goal of improving their stability and dissuading them from carrying out overly risky 
activities. One way is through regulations and the other is through imposing direct ‘fiscal’ 
taxes that raise revenues. Regulations have been the dominant way of ensuring the stability of 
banks. The post-crisis Basel-III framework strengthens the minimum capital requirements 
required by Basel-I and Basel-II and introduces new regulatory requirements in the form of 
bank liquidity and leverage ratios. Nevertheless, big banks remain implicitly insured by 
taxpayers and can consequently raise funds more cheaply than strategically less important 
banks that are not too big or too complex to be allowed to fail. This gives them a competitive 
advantage and re-enforces their dominance. In response to this, systemically important 
financial institutions (SIFIs) are required to hold supplementary capital as recommended by 
the Financial Stability Board (FSB, 2011) and attention is now turning to GLAC, the general loss 
absorbing capacity of banks and the banking system (Mullineux, 2014).  
 
Whilst we see regulatory reforms are moving in the right direction1 and keeping in mind the 
usefulness of regulations to ensure financial stability, we argue that the regulatory and structural 
measures should be augmented by (fiscal) taxation and also that a balance between regulation and 
taxation should be aimed for. We support Adam Smith’s (Smith, 1776) widely accepted ‘principles’ 
of fairness and efficiency in taxation and propose that they should be used to balance the regulatory 
and fiscal taxation of banks (and other financial institutions), noting that regulatory and fiscal taxes 
may potentially be interchangeable.  
 
The IMF (2010) proposes the use of taxes and regulations to counteract micro- and macro-prudential 
risk in the financial system. While micro-prudential supervision focuses on individual institutions, 
macro-prudential supervision aims to mitigate risks to the financial system as a whole (‘systemic 
risks’). The Bank of England (2009) highlighted that macro-prudential policy was missing in the 
prevailing policy framework and the gap between macro-prudential policy and micro-prudential 
supervision had widened over the previous decade. The focus of regulations has primarily been on 
                                                          
1 In the form of a structural proposal of solving the problem of ‘too big to be allowed to fail’ by separating the 
investment and commercial bank activities of ‘universal banks’, ‘ring-fencing’ of retail banking by UK’s 
Independent Commission on Banking (ICB, 2011 and PCBS, 2013a) and new capital, leverage and liquidity 
proposed by Basel III (BIS, 2011). 
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micro-prudential regulation and supervision. The GFC has emphasized the need for a macro 
prudential framework that can address systemic risks and hence focus on the stability of the financial 
system by providing self-insurance and external-insurance (Haldane, 2014). Recently, some measures 
to ‘tax’ banks have been devised to measure the macro-economic impact of the financial institutions. 
These include: Conditional Value-at-Risk (CoVaR), by Adrian and Brunnermeier (2011); Systemic 
Expected Shortfall (SES), by Acharya et al. (2010), proposing a tax on the default risk of a bank; and 
the Market-based tax by Hart and Zingales (2009), proposing a bank tax on the value of credit default 
swap contracts. We portray the taxation of banks as a macro-prudential regulation and argue that there 
is a need to put fiscal taxation to compensate for the systemic risk posed by banks to the financial 
system and to reflect that the costs of bailing them out are not borne by the public finances. 
 
In this paper, we study how banks are regulated and taxed in a number of countries and 
analyse how they could be taxed to achieve a fair and efficient balance between regulatory 
and fiscal taxes. Additionally, we provide an overview of the taxation of financial activities 
(the Financial Activities Tax, or FAT), the taxation of financial instruments trading (the 
Financial Transaction Tax, or FTT) and the taxation of banking products and services using a 
Value Added Tax, or VAT. We note that revenue from such taxes could be hypothecated in 
order to build both ‘bank resolution’ and deposit guarantee funds, and also to finance bank 
supervisory authorities; which are normally funded out of general taxation or through levies 
on banks and other supervised financial institutions. We furthermore note that regulation is a 
tax, which is needed to avoid double taxation and achieve overall efficiency and fairness. VAT (and 
FTT) can have potentially desirable behavioural effects-extending VAT to financial services reduces 
distortions and raises revenue, at least potentially, and discourages wasteful use of financial services. 
The overall aim is to use taxes to level the playing field and remove distortions. This is difficult to 
achieve whilst there remain Systemically Important Financial Institutions (SIFIs) that require 
taxpayers to be protected through the use of bail-in bonds, such as co-cos, and forced bail-ins of other 
bondholders by governments/regulators (FSB, 2014). It is too soon to tell whether these proposals 
provide a ‘solution’ for the moral hazard problem raised by the SIFIs, but the alternative solution of 
far reaching structural reform involving the breaking up of big banks and/or forcing 'ring fencing' or 
separately capitalized subsidiaries for various commercial and investment banking, trading and asset 
management activities, or stricter separation as in the US Glass-Steagall Act of the 1930s seems 
unlikely to be widely and comprehensively adopted. 
 
We propose elimination of the tax deductibility of the ‘expensing’ of interest on debt because current 
business tax rules encourage excessive debt issuance and favours debt over equity, which is in direct 
opposition to what bank regulations require, namely raising extra equity to make banks safer. Second, 
4 
 
we support the prevailing view that a Financial Transactions Tax (FTT) is economically inefficient 
because it reduces market trading volume and liquidity and increases volatility and the cost of capital 
for firms. Third, we prefer UK-style stamp duty on equities as a revenue raiser whose major benefit 
might be to serve as a ‘Tobin Tax’ (Tobin, 1978) discouraging wasteful over-trading of shares and 
‘short-termism’. Fourth, we propose the removal of the exemption of financial services from VAT in 
order to achieve greater efficiency in taxation, as recommended in the Mirrlees Report (Mirrlees, 
2010), and to discourage over use of financial services and the elimination of the distortionary ‘free 
banking’ system (Mullineux, 2013). Sixth, we note the overlap between the UK Bank Levy (HM 
Treasury, 2010), which was initially designed to discourage reliance on wholesale money market 
funding in favour of retail deposits taking, but has increasingly been used to hit revenue raising 
targets, and the proposed Basel-III Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR) and Net Stable Funding Ratio 
(NSFR). This should be rectified to eliminate double taxation. Finally, the proposed FTT by the 
European Union is likely to reduce market liquidity and the proposed Basel-III liquidity ratios (LCR 
and NSFR) may also reduce it because they require banks to hold more liquidity on their balance 
sheets. This may reduce the number of buyers in the market and could cause difficulties when many 
banks are seeking to sell liquid assets following a major adverse event. We thus propose a cautious 
approach to the implementation of FTT on top of the Basel-III liquidity ratios, especially as it 
undermines the ‘repo’ market, which underpins the interbank markets and the central banks’ liquidity 
management channel. 
 
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows: Section 2 makes a comparison between 
regulations and taxation and section 3 provides an overview of existing taxation and related issues. 
Section 4 discusses the financial taxes; section 5 provides the policy recommendations and section 6 
concludes the paper.  
 
2. Regulations and Taxation 
The IMF’s (2010) idea of using regulatory and other policy measures, including the implementation 
of taxes and surcharge, is not new and has been supported by policy makers for some time. Over a 
decade ago, the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) proposed marrying the micro- and macro-
prudential dimensions of financial stability in a speech by its general manager (Andrew Crockett) that 
proved prescient (Crockett, 2000). The focus of micro-prudential supervision is on individual 
institutions whereas the focus of macro-prudential supervision is to mitigate risks to the financial 
system. Haldane (2014) argues that the safety of individual banks is neither a necessary nor sufficient 
condition for systemic stability. It is not necessary because individual banks should be allowed to fail 
and not sufficient because the chain is only as strong as its weakest link in an integrated link. Macro-
prudential supervision focuses on reducing asset price inflation, and thus the need to insure against 
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bank failure; it hence protects taxpayers from the need for bail-outs. The proposed tools include 
‘mortgage or home loan (house price) to value’ and ‘loan to income’ ratios; which can be raised in 
response to increasing asset price inflation. They essentially credit controls that can be regarded as a 
targeted ‘tax’ on mortgage lending. 
 Additional macro-prudential tools have been proposed to counter the pro-cyclicality of the banking 
system caused by risk-related capital adequacy, ‘mark-to-market’ accounting, and backward looking 
provisioning against bad and doubtful debts. Examples of these are countercyclical capital and 
liquidity requirements, and non-risk related capital (‘leverage’) ratios; a levy on the outstanding debt 
multiplied with a factor of average time-to-maturity of a bank; and a levy on non-core liabilities 
(Perotti and Suarez, 2009; Shin, 2011; Hansen et al. 2011); and forward looking provisioning, for 
which allowance has been made via changes in the international accounting standards to permit 
forward looking ‘general’ provisioning (Gaston & Song, 2014).  
The capital requirements under Basel framework were not able to prevent banks from taking 
excessive risks, forcing governments to either let them fail or bail them out in the GFC. The proposed 
Basel-III (BIS, 2011) requires banks to increase their capital ratios in order to make them more 
resilient. This helps to address the moral hazard problem created by implicit taxpayer insurance of 
banks and also helps to reassure depositors. However, the Parliamentary Commission on Banking 
Standards (PCBS, 2013a) report argues that the proposed Basel III capital leverage ratio2 of 3% is too 
low, and that it should be substantially higher than this level.3 Admati & Hellwig (2013) favour an 
equity ratio of 30% or more and argue that it will not reduce the lending capacity of banks; rather, it 
will increase it because banks will become less risky and able to raise equity more cheaply from the 
capital market. Because the leverage ratio is implemented on a gross and non-weighted basis, it might 
encourage banks to increase their exposure to high-risk, high-return lending and could potentially 
increase their risk exposures and lending to SMEs, inter alia, helping to overcome the credit to crunch 
perhaps. The parallel Basel risk-weighted capital adequacy requirements would limit this tendency, 
however and the balance between the leverage and risk weighted capital ratios needs to be carefully 
thought through to avoid double taxation and distortions. Furthermore, as highlighted by Mullineux 
(2012), the increased emphasis on core equity will put the small saving banks at a disadvantage 
because they cannot issue equity, potentially reducing diversity in banking; which is widely seen as 
beneficial (Mullineux, 2014). 
                                                          
2 Note that there is a difference between leverage ratio and RWA (Risk Weighted Assets) capital ratios. 
Leverage ratio is the ratio of tier 1 capital to average total assets, whereas RWA tier 1 capital ratio is the tier 1 
capital divided by the risk weighted assets. RWA are the assets weighted according their risk. 
3 In October 2014 it was anticipated that the Prudential Regulation Authority (PRA) at the Bank of England 




Alongside this re-regulation, broader interest in financial sector taxation has been increasing. The 
European Commission’s (EC, 2010) report on financial sector taxation puts forward three arguments 
in favour of the use of taxation. They consider taxation, in addition to regulations, to be a corrective 
measure to reduce the risk taking activities by the financial sector. Secondly, it is a source of revenue 
through which banks, underpinned by taxpayers, can make a fair contribution to public finances, and 
thirdly, it is also a source of funding for the resolution of failed banks. However, studies such as those 
of Shaviro (2011) and Ceriani et al. (2011) have argued that taxes have the potential to exacerbate 
behaviours that may have contributed to the crisis. For instance, tax rules encouraging excessive debt, 
as we have noted, complex financial transactions, poorly designed incentive compensation for 
corporate managers and highly leveraged home-ownership may have all contributed to the crisis.  
 
The last observation has been strongly supported by a recent book by Mian and Sufi (2014), who 
present a strong case that the US subprime crisis was caused by over-indebtedness and the subsequent 
household deleveraging was the major cause of the ‘Great American Recession’ that followed. The 
prevention of future cycle of housing debt requires replacing debt-based contracts with equity based 
home purchase contracts that allow risk sharing and provide for more debt forgiveness. Because firms 
can deduct interest expenses from their payable taxes, this gives a tax advantage to debt finance. Tax 
deductibility of interest on home loans is still permitted in the US, where there are also implicit 
subsidies through mortgage loan guarantees by government sponsored agencies, Switzerland, and a 
number of other countries, also allow tax deductibility of interest on mortgages, but they were 
removed in the UK over a decade ago. ‘Debt bias’ is recognised in the wider public finance literature 
(Auerbach & Gordon, 2002).  
 
The IMF (2010) argues that debt financing could in principle be offset by taxes at a personal 
level - relatively light taxation of capital gains favours equity, for instance. However, in 
reality, the importance of tax-exempt and non-resident investors, the prevalence of avoidance 
schemes focused on creating interest deductions, and the common discourse of market 
participants suggest that debt is often strongly tax-favoured. In fact, Weichenrieder & 
Klautke (2008) show that debt biasness leads to noticeably higher leverage for non-financial 
companies. Moreover, the proliferation prior to the crisis of hybrid instruments (such as Trust 
Preferred Securities; Engel et al., 1999) attracting interest in deduction yet allowable (subject 





Ceriani et al. (2011) consider the taxation of residential buildings and the deductibility of mortgage 
interest, the taxation of stock options and other performance-based remuneration, and the interaction 
between securitization and the tax system. They argue that three kinds of taxation contributed to the 
global financial crisis and the repeal of capital gains taxation on home selling through the 1997 US 
Tax Relief Act was particularly important. In the US there is evidence of preferential tax treatment on 
the employer’s side, which may have contributed to the success of stock-based remuneration plans. 
Stock options, nevertheless, force managers to go for short-term profits instead of having a long-term 
focus. Furthermore, Ceriani et al. (2011) argue that securitization creates opportunities for tax 
arbitrage and reduces the total tax paid by the originator, the special purpose vehicle (SPV) and the 
final investor. Because of tax differences in different countries, the SPV may be a tax-free vehicle 
under foreign law. The SPV offsets incomes that are otherwise taxed at a different rate by pooling 
interest incomes, capital gains and losses. It also defers the tax until the SPV distributes incomes on 
the securities it has issued or profits are realized.  
 
Keen (2011) presents an interesting debate over the choice of taxation or regulation as a measure to 
attain the stability of a financial system. He highlights that taxation strengthens public buffers to 
address bank failure and crisis, whereas regulation focuses on private buffers. For strongly correlated 
negative shocks, public buffers provide a useful risk-pooling role and reduce the incidence of bank 
failures. However, for strongly positively correlated shocks across institutions, the benefit of risk 
pooling and economy of scale disappears. Taxation is more beneficial in dealing with macro-
prudential risks, whereas regulation, while leaving institutions to respond appropriately to systemic 
crises, may enable a more robust response to macro- prudential concerns.  
 
De Nicolo et al. (2012) study the impact of bank regulation and taxation in a dynamic setting, in 
which banks are exposed to capital and liquidity risk. They find that capital requirements can mitigate 
banks’ incentives to take on the excessive risk induced by deposit insurance and limited liability, and 
can increase efficiency and welfare. By contrast, liquidity requirements significantly reduce lending, 
efficiency and welfare. If these requirements are too strict, then the benefits of regulation disappear, 
and the associated efficiency and social costs may be significant. On taxation, corporate income taxes 
generate higher government revenues and entail lower efficiency and welfare costs than taxes on non-
deposit liabilities. Coulter et al. (2013) argue that taxation and regulation are fundamentally the same; 
however, if taxes are paid ex ante, unless they are pure capital, the double-edged aspect of taxation 
arises.  
 
This leads us to evaluate the existing taxes and related issues that are related to the financial sector. 




First is the corporate income tax (CIT). There are two main differences between financial and non-
financial corporations. These concern the treatment of bad and doubtful loans and the non-application 
of thin capitalization rules to the financial sector. As far as bad and doubtful loans are concerned, the 
differential treatment may provide a cash-flow (liquidity) advantage, but not a tax advantage. To limit 
excessive debt financing and so to minimize the adverse tax consequences of excessive interest 
deductions, several countries have set up ‘thin capitalization rules’ or rules ‘limiting interest 
deductions’. These rules determine how much of the interest paid on corporate debt is deductible for 
tax purposes, thus limiting the amount of interest deduction when a certain debt-equity ratio is 
exceeded. In certain countries, for example in the Netherlands, rules also provide for a limitation of 
interest expenses, for instance when they exceed interest income.4 The Table 1 in the Appendix 
provides an overview of Thin Capitalization Rules around the world. 
 
To discourage the excessive debt financing,  economic theory offers two potential solutions: a 
Comprehensive Business Income Tax (CBIT), which disallows the interest deductibility of debt (IMF, 
2010) and an Allowance for Corporate Equity (ACE), which allows companies to retain interest 
deductibility but also allow a deduction for a notional return on equity.5 The Table 2 in the Appendix 
provides an overview of ACE around the world.  
There are generally no differences in the treatment of the personal income of workers employed in the 
financial sector, except for the introduction of a special bonus tax (albeit temporary for some EU 
member states) on financial sector employees. A special enhanced tax on bonuses would lead to 
higher tax rates than personal income taxation alone. In a limited number of countries, stock options 
and bonuses benefit from a favourable tax treatment, but this treatment is available across all sectors. 
Also, some studies (Egger et al., 2012 and Philippon and Reshef, 2009) find earnings premium in the 
financial sector. 
 
3. Financial Taxes 
The IMF (2010) argues that there may be reasons to consider additional tax measures beyond a levy. 
This is because the large fiscal, economic, and social costs of financial crises may suggest a 
contribution of the financial sector to general revenues beyond covering the fiscal costs of direct 
support (Keen, 2011). Moreover, taxes might have a role in correcting adverse externalities arising 
from the financial sector, such as the creation of systemic risks and excessive risk taking. Specifically, 
                                                          
4 See Staderini (2001), Klemm (2006), Pricen (2010) and EC (2011) for detail. 
5 An overview of the design issues of ACE can be found in OECD (2007) and IMF (2009). 
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proposals include taxes on short-term and/or foreign exchange borrowing; on high rates of return (to 
offset any tendency for decision takers to attach too little weight to downside outcomes); and for 
corrective taxes related to the notions of systemic risks and interconnectedness. The underlying belief 
or assumption is that receipts from these taxes would go to general revenue, although they need not 
equal the damage – however defined – that they seek to limit or avert6. Explicitly corrective taxes, on 
systemic risk for instance, would need to be considered in close coordination with regulatory changes 
to assure capital and liquidity adequacy. The remainder of this section focuses on two possible 
instruments directed primarily to revenue raising,7 although in each case their behavioural, and hence 
potentially corrective, impact cannot be ignored.  
 
 
3.1 Financial Transactions Tax (FTT)  
A Financial Transaction Tax (FTT) is a tax placed on financial transactions that has to be borne by the 
consumers. From the beginning of the financial crisis, the design and implementation of an FTT has 
received much attention. According to the EC (2010) report, the financial sector might be too large 
and take excessive risks because of actual or expected state support. As a result this moral hazard 
problem, the financial market is very volatile and this creates negative external effects for the rest of 
the economy. The EC argues that an FTT might be used as a corrective tool for the existence of this 
moral hazard, thereby enhancing the potential efficiency and stability of financial markets.  
Tobin’s tax (Tobin, 1978) on foreign exchange tax is a particular form of an FTT, which is an 
internationally uniform tax on all spot conversion of one currency into another. The underlying 
presumption is that the tax would deter short-term financial ‘round trip’ currency transactions, or 
wasteful ‘over-trading’. Tobin’s proposal on exchange rates and the efficiency of monetary policies 
remains very informative for today’s debate on a general FTT, and indeed Tobin (Tobin, 1984) 
extended the argument for applying FTT to the trading of financial instruments, and not just 
currencies. As the IMF (2010) states, the common feature focused on here is the applicability of the 
tax to a very wide range of transactions. Advocates of FTT argue that its implementation could raise 
substantial amounts: it has been estimated that a tax of one basis point would raise over $200 billion 
annually if levied globally on stocks, bonds and derivative transactions, and a 0.5 basis point Tobin 
tax on spot and derivative transactions in the four major trading currencies would raise $20-$40 
                                                          
6 The reason is that corrective taxes need to address the marginal social damage from some activity, which may 
differ from the average damage. 
7 The EC (2010) reports other possibilities, including for instance a surcharge on the rate of corporate income 




billion (IMF, 2010). Moreover, Schulmeister et al. (2008) estimate that the revenue of a global FTT 
would amount to 1.52% of world GDP at a tax rate of 0.1%. On the other hand, it is estimated that in 
Europe tax revenues would be 2.1% of GDP if a similar tax were imposed.8 
Furthermore, FTT cannot be dismissed on the grounds of administrative impracticality. In fact, as the 
IMF (2010) notes, most G20 countries, including the UK, already tax some financial transactions. For 
instance, Argentina, which has the broadest coverage, taxes payments into and from current accounts, 
and in Turkey, all the receipts of banks and insurance companies are taxed. Other countries charge 
particular financial transactions, such as the 0.5% stamp duty on locally registered share purchases in 
the United Kingdom and there is also a stamp duty charge on house purchases. As experience with 
UK stamp duty on share purchases shows, collecting taxes on a wide range of exchange-traded 
securities, and, possibly also financial derivatives, could be straightforward and cheap if levied 
through central clearing mechanisms. Table 3 in the Appendix gives an overview of Securities 
Transaction Tax around the world. 
Nevertheless, some important practical issues have not yet been fully resolved. For instance, it might 
be expected that an FTT might drive transactions into less secure channels; but there is a post crisis 
countervailing regulatory requirement to require more financial instrument transactions to be 
undertaken through exchanges with central counterparties and clearing. However, implementation 
difficulties are not unique to the FTT, and a sufficient basis exists for practical implementation of at 
least some form of FTT to focus on the central question of whether there would be any substantial 
costs from implementing an FTT.  
Schamp (2011) notes that if the implementation of the FTT were limited to a few jurisdictions, it 
would be unlikely to raise the revenue sought, because avoidance of the trading market subject to the 
transaction tax would result in a substantial decrease in the tax base. Nevertheless, the implementation 
of an FTT in all major financial centres would be sufficient to prevent avoidance, as liquidity and 
legal requirements are still decisive factors and in many tax havens transaction costs are much higher 
compared to industrialized countries (UN, 2010 and Cortez & Vogel, 2011). Besides, a global basis is 
needed to ensure a worldwide playing field for global financial players. Regarding tax avoidance or 
                                                          
8 It should be noted that the revenue potential of financial transaction taxes will inter‐alia depend on their impact 
on trading volumes. For the estimates discussed, a ‘medium transaction‐reduction‐scenario’ is assumed. In that 
situation, Schulmeister (2011) assumes that the volume of spot transactions in the stock and bond market would 
decline by 10% and 5% respectively. Moreover, the reduction in trading volume of exchange‐traded derivatives 




evasion, experience shows that financial transactions seem to be particularly vulnerable to avoidance 
or evasion. For instance, in the United Kingdom, ‘contracts in differences’ are used to avoid the tax. A 
‘contract for difference’ is a financial product which reallocates the income associated with share of 
ownership, without changing the ownership itself. However, to mitigate the incentive for such 
engineering, the tax rate could be set lower than the avoidance costs and tax authorities could react 
precisely by incorporating new financial instruments in the tax base (Schamp, 2011).  
 
Schamp (2011) argues that FTT is likely to increase the cost of capital because investors would 
demand a higher minimum rate of return on their investment, given the rise in transaction costs and 
hence the expectation of a decrease in future profits. For this scenario, Bond et al. (2004) find that 
after stamp duty in the UK was halved in 1986, share price increases depended on market turnover. 
As a consequence of the increased cost of capital, fewer investment projects will be profitable, and 
hence investment and economic growth in the economy will be hampered (Schamp, 2011). However, 
Cortez & Vogel (2011) argue that the increase in the cost of capital could be restricted if the 
government issued fewer bonds as a result of the additional revenue raised by the FTT. This in turn 
would increase the demand for non-government securities and consequently increase the rate of return 
on non-government securities. 
Most importantly, the real burden of an FTT may fall largely on final consumers rather than, as often 
seems to be supposed, earnings in the financial sector. Although, undoubtedly, some of the tax would 
be borne by the owners and managers of financial institutions, a large part of this burden may well be 
passed on to the users of financial services, both businesses and individuals, in the form of reduced 
returns on savings or higher costs of borrowing.9 According to the IMF (2010), this is because an FTT 
is levied on every transaction, so the cumulative, ‘cascading’ effects of the tax, charged on values that 
reflect the payment of tax at earlier stages, can be significant and non-transparent. Moreover, it is not 
obvious that the incidence would fall mainly on either the better-off or financial sector rentiers.10 In 
sum, since the incidence of an FTT remains unclear, it should not be thought of as a well-targeted way 
of taxing any rents earned in the financial sector.  
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Schwert & Seguin (1993) estimate that a 0.5% securities transaction tax in the U.S. would increase the cost 
of capital by 10‐18 basis points.  
 
10 Although most current proponents of an FTT do not envisage that its base would include current account bank 
transactions, it is cautionary to recall that while some have advocated this as a relatively progressive form of 
taxation, such evidence as there is suggests the opposite (Arbelaez et al., 2005). 
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Further, the IMF (2010) argues that care should be taken in assessing the potential efficiency of an 
FTT in raising revenue, because11 an FTT taxes transactions between businesses; including indirectly 
through the impact on the prices of non-financial products. The argument that an FTT would cause 
little distortion because it would be levied at a very low rate on a very broad base is not very 
persuasive. In fact, a central principle of public finance is that if the sole policy objective is to raise 
revenue, then taxing transactions between businesses, which many financial transactions are, is 
unwise because distorting business decisions reduces total output; while taxing that output directly 
can raise more taxes. Technically, a tax levied on transactions at one stage ‘cascades’ into prices at all 
further stages of production. Hence, for instance, most countries have found that VAT, which 
effectively excludes transactions between businesses, is a more efficient revenue-raiser than turnover 
taxes.12 For revenue-raising, there are more efficient instruments than an FTT.  
 
There is a general consensus in the empirical literature that FTT reduces in market volume and 
liquidity and increases market volatility and the cost of capital (Amihud & Mendelson, 1992; Umlauf, 
1993; Jones & Seguin, 1997; Baltagi et al. 2006; Bloomfield et al., 2009; Pomeranets & Weaver, 
2011). The study by Pomeranets & Weaver (2011) examines changes in market quality associated 
with nine modifications to the New York State Securities Transaction Tax (STT) between 1932 and 
1981. They find that the New York FTT increased individual stock volatility, widened bid-ask 
spreads, increased price impact, and decreased volume on the New York Stock Exchange.  
There is also the notorious example of an FTT in Sweden in 1984, which introduced a 1% tax on 
equity transactions in 1984, which it increased to 2% in 1986 (Umlauf, 1993). He found that stock 
prices and turnover declined after an increase in the rate of FTT to 2% in 1986. Trading volume fell 
by 30%, and 60% of the 11 most traded shares migrated to London to avoid the tax. In 1989, the 
scope of the tax was broadened to include bonds, which led to 85% and 98% reductions in bond 
trading volume and bond derivatives trading volumes respectively. The tax reduced the liquidity of 
the market but did not reduce their volatility. 
                                                          
11 See Schmidt (2007), Schulmeister et al. (2008), and Spratt (2006) for further details. 
12 In the case of a turnover tax, tax paid on inputs ‘sticks’. However, with VAT, a credit is provided for input tax 




Initial evidence13 shows that  FTT in France and Italy has reduced volume and liquidity in the market. 
The French FTT has also failed to raise the expected revenue due to reduction in the volume of over-
the-counter OTC transactions. In the available academic literature, there is consensus that the French 
STT (Securities Transaction Tax) has reduced the traded values and turnover (Capelle-Blancard & 
Havrylchyk, 2013; Colliard & Hoffman, 2013; Meyer et al., 2013; Parwada et al., 2013); however, the 
evidence on liquidity and volatility is mixed. Parwada et al. (2013) and Haferkorn & Zimmermann 
(2013) give empirical evidence of reduction in liquidity while Capelle-Blancard & Havrylchyk (2013) 
and Meyer et al. (2013) find no evidence of reduction in liquidity with the introduction of  French 
STT. The impact of STT is statistically insignificant in the studies by Capelle-Blancard & Havrylchyk 
(2013), Colliard & Hoffman (2013) and Haferkorn & Zimmermann (2013) while Becchetti et al., 
(2013) give evidence of negative effect of STT on the volatility (see Capelle-Blancard, 2014 for 
detail).  
 
The originally proposed EU FTT is broader, than UK, French and Italian stamp duty, in the sense that 
it taxes cash and derivatives across all asset classes, with the exception of spot foreign exchange. The 
EU FTT proposal was to levy 0.1% on stock and bond trades and 0.01% on derivatives. It was to be 
applicable on any transaction involving one financial institution with its headquarters in the tax area, 
or trading on behalf of a client based in the tax area. However, to date (October 22, 2014) the 
participating member states are struggling to make much progress despite the expression of their 
desire to see real progress with the proposed EU FTT earlier this year. The differences are on the 
scope and on the revenue allocation. For the scope, it is not clear whether it will have a narrow scope 
similar to existing French and Italian FTTs or a broad scope as advocated by the German 
Government. Next, whether the residence or issuance principle should prevail as far as the 
implementation scope of the tax is concerned. Under residence principle, the FTT will be applicable 
to transactions entered into by a financial institutions resident in the FTT area, even if the subject 
assets are not from the FTT area while issuance principle is much like UK stamp duty or the French 
and Italian FTTs where the FTT will be applicable to transactions on assets issued by a financial 
institution in the FTT area. Regarding the revenue allocation, no agreement has been reached on 
alternative allocation models and potential sharing of models.  
 
Critics were of the view that such a generally applied FTT would damage the repo market, which is 
important for interbank financing and as a conduit for central bank monetary policy implementation, 
because it taxes on both buy and sell legs of repo, and reverse repo, trades. Repo trades also play an 
                                                          
13 http://marketsmedia.com/italian-french-trading-volumes-hit-ftt/ dated April 23, 2014, 




important role in clearing of activities, collateralization of payments between banks, and provision of 
market liquidity for smaller currency areas.  
 
 
3.2. Value Added Tax (VAT) 
A VAT is a consumption tax that is collected on the value added at each stage of production. This is 
different to a retail sales tax (RST), which is charged on sales to final consumers. In order to 
understand a VAT (or Government Sales Tax, GST) on financial services, it is important to 
distinguish between the purchase of financial services by businesses and consumers. The literature 
concludes (Firth & McKenzie, 2012) that purchases of financial services by businesses should not be 
subject to GST, whereas for purchases by consumers the answer is not so clear. Firth & McKenzie 
(2012) observe that the non-taxation of intermediate financial transactions with businesses can be 
achieved in two fundamental ways. If GST is levied on the purchase of a financial service, regardless 
of whether or not the underlying price is explicit or implicit by way of  margin (and ignoring 
measurement issues with regard to the latter for now; this issue will be discussed below), the business 
should obtain a full input credit for the GST paid on the service, and the financial institution providing 
the service should obtain full credit for the GST paid on the inputs purchased to produce the service. 
If no GST is levied on the transaction, then the GST levied on the inputs used by the financial 
intermediary to provide the service to businesses should still be fully credited on the part of the 
financial intermediary, achieving  ‘zero-rating’. 
It is important to note that it is a very common practice to exempt financial products and services 
from VAT, meaning that the tax is not charged to the consumer, but tax paid on related inputs is not 
recovered. Therefore, financial services are effectively ‘input-taxed’. On one hand, the reason behind 
the implementation of VAT exemption on financial services lies in the conceptual difficulty that 
arises when payment for service is implicit in an interest rate spread, between borrowing and lending 
rates, for instance. Taxing the overall spread may be easy, but proper operation of the VAT requires 
some way of allocating that tax between the two sides of the transaction so as to ensure that registered 
businesses receive a credit but final consumers do not.  
Exemption means that business use of financial services tends to be over-taxed, but use by final 
consumers is under-taxed. Hence, prices charged by the financial institutions are likely to reflect the 
unrecovered VAT charged on their inputs, so that business users will pay more than they would have 
in the absence of the VAT. Generally, the credit mechanism of the VAT ensures that it does not affect 
prices paid by registered users on their purchase. But, exemption means that this is not so, either for 
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financial institutions themselves, or their customers and, through further cascading, the customers of 
their customers. Of course, this runs counter to the principle underlying the VAT, that transactions 
between businesses should not be taxed unless doing so addresses some clear market failure. 
Moreover, exemption for final consumers is likely to mean under-taxation, since the price they pay 
does not reflect the full value-added by financial service providers, but only their use of taxable 
inputs. Further, cheaper financial services may encourage over consumption of them. Why should 
there be a low rate of VAT on the use of financial services? Atkinson & Stiglitz (1976) and Mirrlees 
et al., (2011, Chapter 6) argue for taxation of financial services at a relatively low rate because of their 
use of free time for paid work, so that favourable treatment helps counteract the general tendency of 
taxation to discourage work effort. Since the adoption of the Sixth VAT Directive in 1977 (Article 
135 (1) of the VAT Directive), the EU’s common value added tax system has generally exempted 
mainstream financial services, including insurance and investment funds.  
The Directive reflects an uncertain approach, in that it allows EU member states the option of taxing 
financial services. However, the difficulty arises of technically defining the price for specific financial 
operations. Studies such as those by Kerrigan (2010) and Mirrlees et al. (2011, Chapter 8) provide a 
detailed discussion of the problem of VAT on financial services, arguing that around two-thirds of all 
financial services are margin-based, which makes the implementation of the invoice-credit VAT 
system very difficult in this respect. Nevertheless, this difficulty seems to be surmountable. For 
instance, in Germany, where the granting of loans is subject to VAT under the option to tax, an 
acceptable methodology seems to have been found to tax these margin-based operations.14 Yet, the 
extent to which applying VAT to the financial sector (and its clients) would raise additional tax 
revenues and, consequently, the extent to which the exemption constitutes a tax advantage for the 
financial sector remains an unsettled empirical question. Known as the ‘irrecoverable VAT problem’, 
the exemption means that the financial sector does not charge VAT on most of its output, so it cannot 
deduct the VAT charged on its input. Estimates by Genser & Winker (1997) and EC (2011) indicate 
that the VAT exemption of financial services will be an advantage for the financial sector. The EC 
(2011) report notes that the results do not change significantly when other estimates for the 
irrecoverable VAT based on sector account data are used. See Table 4 in the Appendix for detail. 
Although the inclusion of the financial sector in VAT would indeed lead to price changes, such 
changes should be seen as the correction to an existing distortion rather than a new distortion. The 
reason is that next to the question of whether VAT on financial services would raise revenues, there is 
                                                          
14 Satya & Morley (1997) propose the application of a transaction‐based VAT known as the ‘Truncated Cash‐
Flow Method with Tax Calculation Account’ as another theoretical possibility. Ernst & Young (1996) have 
considered such alternative approaches. 
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an economic distortion arising from the current VAT exemption. While services provided to 
households are too cheap, services to businesses are more expensive, leading to a misallocation of the 
consumption of financial services. Moreover, it can be deduced (following IMF, 2010), that the net 
impact of exemption is likely to be less tax revenue and a larger financial sector. Evidence suggests 
that revenue would be increased by only taxing the final use of financial services at the standard VAT 
rate (Huizinga, 2002; Genser & Winkler, 1997). At the same time, the effect on the size of the sector 
depends on the relative price sensitivities of business and final use, even though the same evidence 
creates some presumption that the exemption of many financial services under current VAT results in 
the financial sector being larger than it would be under a perfectly functioning, single rate VAT.  
However, Grubert & Mackie (2000) argue that financial services are not purchased for their 
consumption value, but rather to facilitate final consumption and should not be taxed. Boadway & 
Keen (2003) argue that many goods and services that one would question should be taxed using a 
GST. They have a similar characteristic because they are a means to an end rather than ends in 
themselves, and are therefore intermediate transactions. Indeed, virtually every good may be thought 
of in those terms, in the sense that they are inputs into some notion of well-being or production 
process, but the idea of VAT is to concentrate on the value added. As per the Corlett-Hague (1953) 
rule, to minimize the costs of distortions caused by the tax system, goods that are more 
complementary with the consumption of leisure, which is generally viewed as being non-taxable, 
should be taxed at higher rates. Since financial services are exempt from VAT, they are implicitly 
considered equivalent to a necessity, with a view not to pass on the tax burden to the final consumers. 
In sum, VAT exemption results in the preferential treatment of the financial sector compared with 
other sectors of the economy, as well as in distortions of prices. 
 
New Zealand and Australia have been put forward as a more efficient and a fair model that seems to 
avoid some of the potential distortive impacts of the implementation of VAT. New Zealand 
introduced a uniform GST in 1986 (VAT is called GST in New Zealand) and considered it efficient 
because of relatively fewer exemptions than in the UK and the EU. Dickson & White (2012) describe 
the compliance and administrative costs of GST as regressive; however, relief to the poor strata of 
society is provided via the income tax and social welfare systems. As reported by 
PriceWaterHouseCoopers (PWC, 2006), in New Zealand, although exemption is afforded to many 
supplies of financial services, these supplies can be zero rated (at the option of the supplier) when 
made to principally taxable persons.15 This guarantees that financial service providers can recover a 
substantial or significant GST incurred on inputs purchased from third-party suppliers.  
                                                          
15 See GST Guidelines for Working with New Zero Rating Rules for Financial Services, published by the policy 
advice division of the Inland Revenue Department (New Zealand), October 2004.  
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In addition, in New Zealand, GST exemption does not include non-life insurance, provision of 
advisory services, equipment leasing, creditor protection policies and some other financial 
intermediation services. However, transactions dealing with money, issuance of securities, provision 
of credit and loans and provision of life insurance are still exempted (Poddar & Kalita, 2008). The 
New Zealand system of taxation of non-life insurance would seem to have been followed in a number 
of other countries, including South Africa and Australia,16 and very broadly it taxes gross premiums 
but gives insurers the ability to reclaim deemed input tax on indemnification of payments, whether or 
not made to GST-registered insured parties. In this case, the model uses taxes on insurers’ cash flows 
as a surrogate for value added.  
The narrow definition of financial services, in the form of Business to Business (BTB) or Business to 
Consumer (BTC) transactions, has made many of them taxable, which otherwise would have been 
exempt. The exemption does not apply to brokering and facilitating services; it includes only 
borrowing and lending. With respect to Australia, the exemption approach to financial services 
applies in principle so that a denial of input credit entitlement arises for GST incurred on related costs. 
In spite of this, the distortive impact of the input credit provision is mitigated by what is termed the 
Reduced Input Tax Credit (RITC) scheme. This scheme, a unique feature of the Australian GST code, 
allows suppliers of financial services to recover 75% of tax paid on specified inputs. A relative of a 
RITC was chosen because of the significant proportion of labour costs typically incurred in providing 
the RITC services. The main objective of the RITC scheme is to eliminate the bias to vertical 
integration (self-supplying inputs) and to facilitate outsourcing, presumably from a cost efficiency 
perspective.17  
Financial services are also exempt from VAT in the EU and banks do not charge any VAT on their 
financial services, nor do they not recover VAT paid on their business inputs. However, there are 
some exceptions of specified fee-based services, such as safety deposit box fees, financial advisory 
services and the zero rating of exported financial services. The Canadian Goods and Services Tax is 
generally similar to the European one with regard to exemption of financial services. However, there 
is a list of fee-based services that are taxed18. The GST is a credit-invoice tax rather than a subtraction 
                                                          
16 The Value Added Tax Act, no 89 of 1991, states that various financial services are exempt from VAT, for 
example long term insurance (sec 2(1)(i) and sec 12(a)). Yet short term insurance and commission received 
from selling long term and short term insurance are taxable supplies and subject to VAT at 14%.  
 
17 See PWC (2006) report for detail. 
18 GST/HST Memoranda Series, Canada Customs and Revenue Agency, April 2000. 
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method tax, which was once proposed in Canada (Schenk, 2010).  
The cases of Israel and Argentina are severe, in the sense that they overtax many financial services. 
Firstly, financial services are exempt from VAT, meaning that they cannot recover the tax on their 
purchases and secondly, banks are required to pay tax on the aggregate of their wages and profits 
(Schenk & Oldman, 2007). In order to contain inflationary pressures, or for that matter to reduce the 
wasteful use of financial services, Argentina taxes gross interest on loans under a VAT at different 
rates. The VAT on these loans to registered businesses is creditable (Schenk & Oldman, 2007). 
 
Virtually all fee-based financial services are taxable or zero-rated under VAT in South Africa. 
However, margin-based services are still exempted. The banks can reclaim input VAT for fee-based 
services. In Singapore, financial services rendered to taxable customers are zero rated because 
financial institutions can claim input credits for VAT. For input VAT that is not attributable to taxable 
supplies or to exempt supplies, a financial service provider must allocate the input tax in proportion to 




3.2.1. Effects of Removing VAT exemption on Financial Services 
As noted in Mirrlees (2011) review, exemption from VAT is against the logic of the tax as it breaks 
down the chain, leaving financial institutions unable to reclaim the input tax. It is clearly 
distortionary, as exemption makes VAT a production tax. Perhaps the biggest distortion is that it 
encourages financial institutions to produce inputs in-house and thus to integrate vertically in order to 
reduce input VAT that is not creditable for financial institutions.  In addition to the discrimination 
against outside suppliers, vertical integration could perhaps be the reason that financial institutions 
take the shape of conglomerates, making them ‘too big to fail’. Because financial institutions across 
the EU face different input costs, exemption creates another distortion, leaving the financial 
institutions with higher input costs uncompetitive.  
  
Another distortion identified by Schenk & Oldman (2007) is that exemption of financial services may 
encourage financial institutions to outsource overseas, which is discrimination against domestic 
suppliers. They explain that if a financial institution obtains an exempted service within the EU, the 
cost may include some disallowed input VAT. However, this is not the case if a service is imported 
from a country with zero-rating on the export of that service.  
 




One of the problems in taxing financial services identified by Benedict (2011) is the valuation issue. 
Apart from some technical problems involved in it, one factor that is desirable from the risk 
management point of view is the transparency of banks’ earnings. It is generally argued that the tax 
can be imposed on the interest rate spread and apportioned between transactors (customers of lending 
and borrowing). This valuation process would result in a transparency of the margins, not only for the 
revenue authorities but also for the public at large. This would reduce information asymmetries, 
which are considered to have been one of the causes of the crisis.  
 
The removal of exemption on financial services would mean that banks 20% (in the case of the UK) 
tax on financial products and services would be paid by consumers, and banks would be allowed to 
reclaim VAT on inputs, which would reduce their costs. It would also increase revenue for the 
government. The only affected party in the case of removal of exemption from VAT would be the 
consumers. It might also improve efficiency because consumers would be discouraged from over-
consuming financial services. Zero rating of financial services reduces VAT revenue, but there will be 
some compensation from increased tax revenue from increased profitability of the banks.  
 
It is important to segregate financial services into fee-based services and margin-based services when 
removing VAT exemption on them. Fee-based services can be categorized as a luxury, with margin-
based services as a necessity. Therefore, tax on such services should be levied based on their elasticity 
of demand. We argued above that raising equity would increase the cost of lending for smaller banks 
and hence will unfavourably impact them and leaving them at a disadvantage. However, the removal 
of exemption of VAT would decrease the undue pressure on banks and give them a level playing 
field, similar to other companies. As highlighted by Mishkin (2012), increased competition resulting 
from the financial innovation that decreased the profitability of banks, may have encouraged the 
excessive risk taking by banks which led to the crisis. We therefore support a combination of both 
approaches of imposing taxation and new regulations, so that the banks would not be adversely 
affected by very strict policies, keeping in mind the tax and regulation heterogeneity that exists across 




3.3. A Bank Levy  
A bank levy, or tax, is as an additional duty imposed on financial institutions, predominantly banks, to 
discourage risky activities and to build some fund that can be drawn upon for bailing out. The UK 
Bank Levy (HM Treasury, 2010) was initially designed to discourage reliance on wholesale money 
market funding in favour of retail deposits taking, but has increasingly been used to hit revenue-
raising targets. The EU is also planning to introduce a bank levy to create a bank resolution fund. 
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Several countries have already taken legislative initiatives in this respect to introduce levies on banks 
that are considered to pose a systemic risk to the economy. Such bank levies are not applied to the 
profits of the bank (as the case of CIT), but are in principle levied on its (relevant) assets, liabilities or 
capital. For example, countries which chose to apply a levy on liabilities broadly speaking include 
Austria, Belgium,Cyprus, Germany, Hungary, Iceland Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Sweden, the 
Netherlands, the UK and the US. On the other hand, the base of the French bank levy is regulatory 
capital, while that of Slovenia is total assets. Although these bases are clearly related, it shows the 
focus of the bank tax.  
 
A few countries such as The Netherlands, the UK and the US seem to tax only bigger banks and 
liabilities if they are beyond a certain threshold. The bank tax in most countries (e.g., Austria, 
Hungary, France, Iceland, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom) 
contributes to the general reserve; however, there is a dedicated resolution fund to draw upon in case 
of a crisis in some other countries (e.g., Cyprus, Germany, Korea, Romania and Sweden). In the US, 
the purpose of the bank tax called the ‘Financial Crisis Responsibility fee’ is different, in the sense 
that it is ex-post and is aimed at recovering any direct costs incurred by the failure of financial 
institutions under the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP). Belgium has three different kinds of 
bank taxes: one similar to the usual bank levies calculated on total liabilities, which contributes to the 
Resolution Fund; and a new bank levy which uses regulated savings deposits as the basis for 
calculating the tax due, contributing to the deposit protection fund and the financial stability 
contribution. Finally, there is a contribution to the Special Protection Fund for the deposits, life 
insurances and capital of recognised cooperative companies, which is calculated taking into account 
certain risk factors. Table 5 in the Appendix provides an overview of Bank Levies around the world. 
 
Since bank levy is not being taxed under standard tax treaties, there is a risk of double taxation. In 
order to avoid this, the UK, German and French authorities are entering into a ‘double taxation 
agreement’, which will allow a proportion of the levy in one country to be credited against the levy in 
the other. This agreement has been enacted in the UK with respect to France from 1 January 2011, 
which allows a proportion of the French levy to be credited against the UK one.  
 
 
In the UK, the treasury secretary has increased the bank levy from 0.105% to 0.13% to 0.142% with 
effect from 1 January 2014. This is the sixth increase in the levy since it was introduced in 2010.  The 
Government has lowered the corporate tax rate from 28% to 24% and then to 22%, which will further 
decrease to 21% from April 2014. The bank levy was increased in order to take away the benefit of 
this reduction from the banking sector and with a view to raise revenue from it. In the UK, the levy is 
applicable to global consolidated balance sheet liabilities less tier 1 capital, protected deposits, 
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sovereign repo liabilities and derivatives on a net basis. Therefore, an increase in bank levy means 
that the treasury secretary is aiming to tax the unsecured borrowings of the banking sector. There 
seems to be an overlap between the increase in bank levy and the proposed Basel-III Liquidity 
Coverage Ratio (LCR) and Net Stable Funding Ratio (NSFR). LCR and NSFR incentivize banks to 
use more stable funding sources by reducing the reliance on short-term ones.  
 
3.4. Financial Activities Tax (FAT) 
 
Another tax that can generate revenue and reduce excessive risk-taking but broader in its scope than a 
banks levy is FAT. FAT is applied to the sum of an institution’s profits and remuneration. 
 
As an alternative to an FTT, the IMF (2010) proposes the implementation of a FAT levied on the sum 
of profits and remuneration of financial institutions, although the two taxes are not mutually 
exclusive. Since aggregate value-added is the sum of profits and remuneration, a FAT in effect taxes 
the net transactions of financial institutions, whereas an FTT taxes gross transactions. However, like 
an FTT, a FAT would, in the absence of special arrangements, tax business transactions because no 
credit would be given to their customers for a FAT paid by financial institutions. Alternative 
definitions of profits and remuneration for inclusion in the base of a FAT would enable it to pursue a 
range of objectives.19 For instance, with the inclusion of all remuneration, the IMF (2010) argues that 
a FAT would effectively be a tax on value added, and so would partially offset the risk of the financial 
sector becoming unduly large because of its favourable treatment under existing VAT arrangements, 
where financial services are exempt. Moreover, to avoid worsening distortions, the tax rate would 
need to be below current standard VAT rates. Because financial services are commonly VAT-exempt, 
the financial sector may be under-taxed and hence perhaps ‘too big’, relative to other sectors. In fact, 
the size of the gross financial sector value-added in many countries suggests that even a relatively 
low-rate FAT could raise significant revenue in a fair and reasonably efficient way. For instance, the 
IMF (2010) report shows that in the UK, a 5% FAT, with all salaries included in the base, might raise 
about 0.3% of GDP.  
Moreover, the IMF (2010) argues that with the inclusion of profits above some acceptable threshold 
rate of return, a FAT would become a tax on ‘excessive’ returns in the financial sector. The 
underlying belief is that it would mitigate the excessive risk-taking that can arise from the 
undervaluation by private sector decision-makers of losses in bad times, because they are expected to 
be borne by others, or ‘socialised’ since it would reduce the after-tax return in good times.20 It should 
                                                          
19 See Appendix 6 of the IMF (2010) report for elaboration on the design and revenue potential of these 
alternative forms of FAT.  
 
20 John et al. (1991) develop the argument for progressive profit taxation on these grounds.  
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be noted that there might be more effective, tax and/or regulatory ways to do this.  
The IMF (2010) also states that the implementation of a FAT should be relatively straightforward, as 
it would be drawn on the practices of established taxes. Naturally, there would be technical issues to 
resolve, but the IMF argues that most are of a kind that tax administrations are used to dealing with. 
Even though there would be difficulties in the potential shifting of profits and remuneration to low-tax 
jurisdictions, a low rate FAT might not add greatly to current incentives for tax planning, and as a 
matter of fact would not greatly change them if adopted at broadly similar rates in a range of 
countries.  
A FAT would tend to reduce the size of the financial sector and will fall on intermediate transactions. 
Hence its implementation does not directly distort the activities of the financial institutions and 
because a FAT is essentially a levy on economic rents, it would tend to reduce the size of the sector 
without changing its activities. The IMF (2010) argues that in many respects a FAT has the nature of 
VAT in the sense that like VAT, there would be no direct impact on the structure of the activities 
undertaken by financial institutions themselves, as liability depends on profit, and not on how it is 
earned or on the volume of turnover. Of course, there would be one difference from VAT, in that the 
tax would also fall on businesses, not just on final consumers.  
 
Shaviro (2012) also favours a FAT over an FTT because of the broad ‘net’ measure of FAT compared 
to a narrow ‘gross’ measure of financial sector activity. The Parliamentary Commission on Banking 
Standards (PCBS, 2013b) report also quotes different parties who prefer a FAT over an FTT for three 
reasons: it is less easily avoidable through relocations; incidence is more certain; and it would 
generate the same amount of revenue with fewer distortions.  
4. Policy Recommendations 
While several policy measures, including taxes, levies and regulatory measures, have been in place, 
and for that matter, many are still under discussion and consideration, the question of what should 
truly circumvent the negative micro-prudential externalities stemming from limited liability and 
asymmetric information (relating to individual institutions) and macro-prudential externalities relating 
to systemic risk still remains unanswered. More importantly, the impact of these externalities on the 
growth and development of several countries remains a source of worry amongst policy makers, 
academics, and several national and international bodies. Macro-prudential supervision as is a device 




for reducing asset price inflation and thus the need to insure against bank failure via capital ratios and 
deposit insurance and resolution funds, but again is untried and untested as yet. Whilst we see 
regulatory reforms are moving in the right direction and keeping in mind the usefulness of regulations 
to ensure financial stability, we argue that the regulatory and structural measures should be augmented 
by (fiscal) taxation and also that a balance between regulation and taxation should be aimed for. We 
note that revenue from such taxes can serve as a deposit guarantee and resolution fund for smaller 
banks. Once the fund is build with a special bank levy, as proposed in the Eurozone, it could be 
dropped and replaced with US-style risk related deposit insurance that would be levied to top up the 
funds as required. Whilst some banks remain ‘TBTF’, special arrangements for SIFIs will be required. 
We provide the following policy recommendations regarding ‘fiscal’ taxation: 
 
We propose elimination of the tax deductibility of the ‘expensing’ of interest on debt because current 
business tax rules encourage excessive debt issuance and favours debt over equity. This is in direct 
opposition to what bank regulations require, namely raising extra equity to make banks safer. This is 
in turn raises the question of whether tax deductibility should be removed from banks alone, as they 
are the licenced creators of credit. However, the increased emphasis on core equity will put the small 
saving banks at a disadvantage because they cannot issue equity very easily. In line with this 
argument, there is a concern about the viability of universal banks. A structural proposal to help solve 
the problem is to separate the investment and commercial banking activities of ‘universal banks’ 
within bank holding companies (BHCs) and to require them to operate as separately capitalized 
subsidiaries, with the aim of making it easier to let parts of the BHC fail whilst ‘resolving’ problems 
in the ‘utility’ part of the bank, so that it can keep functioning without unduly disrupting economic 
activity. In the UK Financial Services (Banking Reform) Act, passed on 18 December 2013, the ‘ring 
fencing’ of retail banking and some commercial banking, and thus the household and small business 
deposits, in line with the Independent Commission on Banking (ICB, 2011) and the Parliamentary 
Commission on Banking Standards (PCBS, 2013a) recommendations, was required to be 
implemented. Further, the UK’s Prudential Regulatory Authority is to consider whether a US Volcker 
Rule (SEC, 2013), which limits the scope of the ‘proprietary’ trading and hedge fund business a bank 
can undertake with the aim of restricting the risk to which bank deposits can be exposed, is 
appropriate for the City. Meanwhile, the EU is still considering the Liikanen Report proposals 
(Liikanan, 2012) for a more limited separation of retail and investment banking than now required in 






The debate about the pros and cons of universal banking is ongoing. Calomiris (2013) argues strongly 
that there are significant economies of scale and scope in banking and also major benefits from the 
cross border operation and competition of universal banks, whilst acknowledging that size matters and 
robust internationally agreed resolution regimes need to be implemented as a backstop.  
 
We support the prevailing view that a Financial Transactions Tax (FTT) is economically inefficient 
because it reduces market trading volume and liquidity and increases volatility and the cost of capital 
for firms. This is especially the case if it is applied to the gross value at each stage of the settlement 
chain of a financial transaction, as initially proposed by the European Commission (EC), unlike VAT; 
which is applicable at the end of the chain. The cumulative effect of charging each agent in a multi-
step execution process can be substantial. An FTT may seem like a tax on banks and other financial 
institutions, but it is highly likely that a good proportion of the costs would be passed on to the end 
investors.  A narrower and relatively low tax, such as the UK ‘Stamp Duty’ on equity sales (and house 
sales), is likely to be much less distortionary and now seems more likely to be adopted by the EU, or 
the Eurozone alone. It would however raise less revenue. Furthermore, imposing an FTT on 
government bond sales would both raise the cost of government funding and be detrimental to the 
‘repo market’, which underpins the interbank markets and thus liquidity in the banking system.  The 
originally proposed FTT by the European Union was applicable to other non-participating member 
countries and to third countries if they were counterparty to financial transaction trading in an FTT 
jurisdiction. Equity issuance is already relatively more costly than debt issuance due to the tax 
deductibility of interest, but not dividend payments, and UK-style stamp duty adds to the cost of 
selling equities; but we might support stamp duty as a revenue raiser whose major benefit might be to 
serve as a ‘Tobin Tax’ (Tobin, 1958) discouraging wasteful over-trading of shares and ‘short-
termism’.  
 
We further propose the removal of the exemption of financial services from VAT in order to achieve 
greater efficiency in taxation, as recommended in the Mirrlees Report (Mirrlees, 2010), and to 
discourage over use of financial services and the elimination of the distortionary UK ‘free banking’ 
system (Mullineux, 2012). Given the operational difficulties linked to the removal of exemption from 
VAT, the cash flow method with Tax Collection Account (TCA) proposed by Poddar and English 
(1997) is recommended. Given the operational difficulties attached to levying VAT on margin based 
financial services, FAT is sometimes given as an alternative solution. As value added is equivalent to 
the wages plus profits of an institution, a FAT would serve as a tax on value added. A FAT is also 
preferred over an FTT because it is less easily avoidable through relocations; its incidence is more 
certain and it would generate the same amount of revenue with fewer inefficiencies. A FAT is also 
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considered to be a broad ‘net’ measure of a VAT compared to an FTT’s narrow ‘gross’ measure of 
financial sector activity.  
 
We note the overlap between the UK Bank Levy (HM Treasury, 2010), which was initially designed 
to discourage reliance on wholesale money market funding in favour of retail deposits taking, but has 
increasingly been used to hit revenue raising targets, and the proposed Basel-III Liquidity Coverage 
Ratio (LCR). This should to be rectified to eliminate double taxation.  
 
Finally, the proposed EU FTT is likely to reduce market liquidity whilst the proposed Basel-III 
liquidity ratios (LCR and the Net Stable Funding Ratio) may also reduce money market liquidity 
because they require banks to hold more liquidity assets on their balance sheets. This may reduce the 
number of buyers in the market and could cause difficulties when many banks are seeking to sell 
liquid assets following a major adverse event. We thus propose a cautious approach to the 
implementation of FTT on top of the Basel III liquidity ratios, especially as it undermines the ‘repo’ 





The Global Financial Crisis (GFC) revealed problems with the regulatory approach to addressing 
externalities arising from excessive bank risk taking. To address these externalities, in this paper, we 
study how banks are regulated and taxed in a number of countries and analyse how they could be 
taxed to achieve a fair and efficient balance between regulatory and fiscal taxes. We highlight overlap 
between regulations and taxation and counteracting effects of each other to remove distortions. We 
note that revenue from such taxes can be used to build both ‘bank resolution’ and deposit guarantee 
funds, and can be dropped once due reparations have been paid and the pooled insurance funds have 
been built up and replaced by risk related premiums levied as required to top up the funds. We 
propose elimination of the tax deductibility of the ‘expensing’ of interest on debt, removal of the 
exemption of financial services from VAT. In line with the view of European Commission (EC, 
2011), we consider taxation, in addition to regulations, to be a corrective measure to reduce the risk 
taking activities by the financial sector. Secondly, it is a source of revenue through which banks, 
underpinned by taxpayers, can make a ‘fair contribution’ to public finances; and thirdly, it is a source 
of funding for the resolution of failed banks. The UK Bank Levy is perhaps best regarded as making a 
fair contribution to compensate taxpayers for the fiscal consolidation, or ‘austerity’, made necessary 
by the need to bail them out and mount a fiscal stimulus to head off a full blown economic recession 
following the GFC. The use of taxes alongside regulations to reduce risk taking activity requires them 




Moreover, as highlighted by the IMF (2010) report, the implementation of several discussed tax and 
regulatory measures needs to be co-ordinated with that of the wider regulatory reform agenda, and the 
effects on the wider economy need to be carefully assessed. So far, regulatory and tax policies 
towards the financial sector have been formed largely independently of each other. Therefore, a more 
holistic approach is needed to ensure that they are properly aligned in both the incentives and the 
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